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SYMPOSIUM: PART III

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: THE FINANCIAL ROLE
OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
James L. Winokur*
© James L. Winokur, 1998

I. EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR
FINANCIAL ROLE

A. The Rise of Community Associations
For over a century, increasing proportions of residential
life in America have been organized into housing developments containing both individually owned residential units
and common areas or facilities. Such housing developments
are governed by private community associations representing
neighbors within each development, through regimes of privately enforceable use restrictions and financial obligations.'
* Professor of Law, University of Denver, College of Law, A.B. 1966,
LL.B. 1969 University of Pennsylvania. The author greatly appreciates the invaluable commentary, ideas and examples of Lynn S. Jordan, Esq., Special
Counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, Denver, Colorado and the
research assistance of Derek Samuelson. Thanks also to Cliff Treese, Becky
Vensel, Rod Clark and, most specially, Layne Homeister Laughlin, CPA, MBA.
1. See generally MARK WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS:
THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING (1987).
These "servitude regimes" have been created in a few closely related forms:
(1) "condominium ownership," where divided ownership of each individual unit
is inseparably tied to ownership by each unit owner of an undivided ownership
interest in the common areas or facilities; (2) "homeowner association" or
'planned community" in which each owner of a separate residence is also a
mandatory member of a homeowner association which, in turn, owns or controls common areas or facilities; and (3) the less frequent "cooperative ownership" in which all residences are owned by a cooperative corporation or other
entity which leases each unit to a resident who also, in turn, owns a proportional share of the cooperative corporation entity. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 478-79 (1997). Under § 1-103,
each of these forms is a common interest community, id. cmt. 8, typically
sharing the elements of common plus divided ownership, restrictive covenants
and monetary assessments administered by a community association. See generally ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 1-2 (1992) (referring to
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Early on, private restrictions in some developments were
aimed at creating enclaves for the privileged by community
beautification, as well as social and racial segregation. 2 The
pace of growth of these privately restricted "servitude regimes" has proceeded throughout this century. However, it
has been during the past thirty five years, that these servitude regimes governed by private community associations
common interest communities as "residential community associations" or
"RCAs"); James L. Winokur, Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The
"Super Priority"Lien and Related Reforms Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 354-55 (1992) [hereinafter
Winokur, Meaner Lienor Associations]. Each of these ownership forms is
within the definition of "common interest community" as set forth in section 1103 of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 478-79 (1997).
Although UCIOA's definition of common interest community does not expressly require restrictive covenants, they are virtually always present in all
forms of such communities. See, e.g., Norman Geis, Beyond the Condominium:
The Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
757, 773-74 (1982).
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which
promulgated UCIOA, has also promulgated separate, though substantially
analogous, Uniform Laws relating to each of the three types of common interest
community. UCIOA is designed to apply to all three on the theory that - despite their formal distinctions-they are all largely functional equivalents and
should be similarly regulated. Hereinafter, provisions cited from UCIOA
should be considered parallel to analogous provisions in each of the other Uniform Laws addressing respective types of common interest communities. For
more information on the Uniform Laws, see infra note 98.
2. See, e.g., WEISS, supra note 1, at 45; HELEN MONCHOW, THE USE OF
DEED RESTRICTIONS IN SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT

(1928).

For historical

treatment of systematic racial and ethnic segregation via homeowner associations and regimes of private restrictions, see EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA 5678 (1994). Enforcement of covenants restricting or prohibiting sale of homes
based on race or ethnicity were held unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), and such discrimination is also prohibited by more recent
legislation. See, eg., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994). The
sweep of anti-discriminatory prohibitions was substantially extended by the
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(1988). See generally 6 PATRICK ROHAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: HOME
OWNER

ASSOCIATIONS AND

PLANNED

UNIT DEVELOPMENTS

-

LAW

AND

PRACTICE ch. 6B (1997). Thus, segregation of races or other minorities accomplished by common interest communities currently occurs either surreptitiously
or indirectly, via the impact of prices sometimes as affected by use restrictions.
See generally MCKENZIE, supra, at 74-78; Stanley Scott, The Homes Association: Will Private Government Serve the Public Interest?, PUBLIC AFF. REP. 8
(1967). Segregationist motives are perceived by some scholars as among the
factors prompting the recent upswing in development of more recently created
gated communities.

See, eg., EDWARD BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER,

FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 74-98, 144-60
(1997).
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have proliferated.
This recent reliance on common interest communities
stems from a revolution in the economics of housing and related development in this country. The progressive increase
in suburban land costs initiated this revolution, 4 leading to
the increased development of clustered housing in suburban
communities. Planners and builders undertook to redefine
the concept of density in residential development. 5 Planners
reasoned that housing costs could be held in check by reducing land allocated to individual residential units which, in6
turn, could be offset by increasing public or common spaces.
The common spaces sometimes contained amenities like
swimming pools, which would be expensive if built for individual homes, but which were economically developed to
serve entire communities. 7 Since the early 1960s, the accelerated shift toward residential development in common inhas been strongly encouraged by the fedterest communities
8
eral government.
3. The number of American common interest communities exploded between 1970 and 1990, from approximately 10,000 to approximately 130,000,
growing from just over 1% of the U.S. housing supply to well over 11% of the
housing

supply.

COMMUNITY

ASS'NS

INST.,

COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION

FACTBOOK 13 (1993) [hereinafter CAI FACTBOOK] (Note: some information contained in the 1992 edition of the CAI Factbook is not repeated in the newest
edition. When citing such material infra, reference will be made to the information as coming from the earlier edition.). By 1992, approximately 150,000
common interest communities were governed by community associations,
housing approximately 32 million people. Id.
4. Between 1948 and the late 1970s, suburban land costs increased from
constituting a national average of 11% of each new housing unit built to 2530%. MARTIN MAYER, THE BUILDERS: HOUSES, PEOPLE, NEIGHBORHOODS,
GOVERNMENTS, MONEY 13 (1978).
5. See generally DAVID WOLFE, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS THAT WORK 7 (1978); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, BULLETIN No. 40,
NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT (1961) [hereinafter
URBAN LAND INST., NEW APPROACHES].
6. URBAN LAND INST., NEW APPROACHES, supra note 5, at 37-39; URBAN
LAND INST., INNOVATIONS VS. TRADITIONS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

(1963); see also A. M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1969);
ROHAN, supra note 2, § 3.02.
7. See generally JON ROSENTHAL, CLUSTER SUBDIVISIONS: PLANNING
ADVISORY SERVICE INFORMATION REPORT (1960).

8. See, e.g., FED. HOUS. ADMIN., LAND PLANNING BULLETIN No. 6,
PLANNED-UNIT DEVELOPMENT WITH A HOMES ASSOCIATION (1964).

FHA work

on this project, including its decision to insure common interest communities,
was part of a public-private partnership which spurred the 1960s boom in
common interest communities. See MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 91-93. The
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In the decades that followed, common interest communities have evolved from an innovation in suburban residential
development to its main staple. 9 In the largest United States
metropolitan areas, a majority of all new housing sold is now
in common interest communities. 10 These common interest
communities include the residences of over 30,000,000
Americans, and in many communities virtually all new substantial residential developments are effectively required to
be in common interest communities. 1 Thus, American residential markets are likely to become dominated by common
interest communities in the decades ahead.
B. FinancialResponsibilitiesof Community Associations:
PrivateProvision of "Public"Facilitiesand Services
The sheer numbers of common interest communities continue to grow at accelerated speed, providing residences for
an increasingly major segment of our population. Therefore,
the society as a whole should be concerned for their viability,
both financial and otherwise. 12 Moreover, governmental and
public policy functions increasingly entrusted to servitude
regimes constitute an important additional reason for public
governments to carefully evaluate and support the continued
viability and effectiveness of these private regimes.
Beginning in the 1960s, common interest communities
most influential document to come out of that partnership was URBAN LAND
INST., TECHNICAL BULLETIN No. 50, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK (rev.
ed. 1964) [hereinafter HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK], masterminded by Byron Hanke (FHA chief of land planning who also worked on this project full
time with the building industry's Urban Land Institute), Professor Jan Krasnowiecki and William Loring of the Public Health Service.
9. See James L. Winokur, Meaner Lienor Associations, supra note 1, at
355.
10. See James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitude:
Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty and PersonalIdentity,
1989 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Winokur, Mixed Blessings]; CAI
FACTBOOK, supra note 3, at inside front cover.
11. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, 1 HOMEOWNERS' ASS'N
TASK FORCE REPORT 12 (1989); Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, The
Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners' Associations, in RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 31, 34 (1989).
12. Analysis of the myriad of non-financial issues which threaten the well
being of common interest communities and the servitude regimes by which they
are governed is well beyond the scope of this article. For extensive considerations of the mixed social impacts of such servitude regimes, with emphasis on
non-financial implications, see generally Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note
10, at 53-55.
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have become a major vehicle for shifting responsibilities previously associated with government agencies to the private
sector. 13 As fiscal pressures on local governments have increased, these governments have encouraged development of
common interest communities. These communities provide
substantial and costly public facilities and services which end
up being financed by developers of such servitude regimes
and, ultimately, by the residents who buy homes and pay assessments to support these amenities. The public facilities
provided range from park-like open spaces to streets, light14
ing, water and sewer facilities and recreational facilities.
Services increasingly provided by common interest communities, but which previously have typically been provided by
public governments, include general facilities maintenance,
trash collection and disposal, and snow removal. 15 The financial responsibilities of community associations are funded
exclusively by the community's residents, who are required to
pay regular and special assessments as needed to meet asso16
ciation costs.
There is substantial evidence to suggest that the "loadshedding" of local government fiscal responsibilities onto
common interest communities has been a conscious govern17
mental strategy for relieving strain on shrinking resources.
13. For strong characterization of provision and controlling of shared use
facilities as a traditionally public governmental role, see, e.g., ROHAN, supra
note 2, § 2.02[3], at 2-12 (1997); see also Robert Natelson, Condominiums Reform and the Unit OwnershipAct, 58 MONT. L. REV. 495, 543-44 (1997); Ronald
B. Cox, Purchase Money Mortgage Held Superior to Liens for Past Due Assessments, 47 S.C. L. REV. 26, 30-31 (1995).

14. DILGER, supra note 1, at 86.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 314; 6
ROHAN, supra note 2, at 7, 49-50.
17. See, eg., Mark Weiss & John Watts, Community Builders and Community Associations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private Residential
Governance, in

RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
ERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 95, 100-02

PRIVATE

GOv-

(1989), in which
the authors describe a shift in the basic purpose of common interest communities beginning in the 1960s from enforcing deed restrictions to maintaining
common property. For analysis at length of the privatization of public facilities
and services, see DILGER, supra note 14, at 61-104. Dilger views this development less as conscious fiscal load-shedding by overburdened public governments than as a manifestation of a national movement toward privatization
and decentralization of decisionmaking as advocated by conservative scholars
inrecent decades (including Dilger himself), and ushered in during the Reagan
era. Id. Nevertheless, he concurs that the rise of common interest communities has imposed on those communities responsibilities previously seen as pub-
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About a decade ago, noted historians of American residential
communities, Mark Weiss and John Watts, concluded:
Developers creating associations increasingly are responding to local governments' subdivision regulations
rather than to the home buyers' interests. Some of the
original market-driven rationale for community associations has been lost.
Developers of small PUD and condominium projects have
been finding that local subdivision regulations through a
variety of incentives either require or encourage them to
create commonly owned property managed by community
associations. In some cases, localities refuse to accept
public dedication of private streets, open space, or other
common areas within a private development.' 8

Even where such privately created and maintained facilities
are not required, these scholars assert,
A variety of facilities - most notably streets but also utility
line, construction, storm drainage, sewers and erosion control - all can be built less expensively if the developers
elect to have them managed privately instead of constructing them according to public standards.
The
[community association] is then created by the developers
chiefly to own and maintain these private facilities, which
cost less to develop initially, but may cost more to repair
and maintain over the long term. 19

The common facilities and services managed by community associations may well have originally been intended for
private use only by residents within each association's common interest community. 20 However, many of these facilities
lic governmental responsibilities. Id. at 87-88. For a very recent analysis of
such "load shedding" in the privatization of previously public services and facilities, see Wayne Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 369-70 (1997).

18. Weiss & Watts, supra note 17, at 101-02. To a similar effect, see C.
James Dowden, Community Associations and Local Governments: The Need for
Recognition and Reassessment, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 27, 28 (1989);

Robert Nelson, The Privatizationof Local Government: From Zoning to RCAs,

in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 45, 47 (1989).

19. Weiss & Watts, supra note 17, at 102. Regarding the risk of substandard facilities provided for a private community association to manage than
would be required for facilities dedicated to public ownership, see also C. JAMES
DOWDEN, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 9-10
(1980).
20. See, eg., MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 88-89.
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and services are provided instead of facilities for which the
public government would be responsible, and except in gated
communities, facilities like roads and open spaces would
seem likely to be used by some portion of the public at large.
[Wihat will happen if the community association, for
whatever reason, is unable to perform its maintenance
and government functions[?] What entity will step forward to maintain the private streets, the facilities, the
open spaces, the open spaces and, indeed, the buildings?
What steps should be taken at the state and local level to
assure that community associations have the capability
and capacity to carry out their responsibilities over the
long run without becoming a burden on local governments
at some future time? 21
II. FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
Maintaining the common interest community is a crucial
association board responsibility.
Control of the finances of the home owner association, especially the preparation of the annual budget, is perhaps
the single most important duty of the board of directors.
Sufficient funds must be available to keep the project operating on a day-to-day basis, to pay for employee and
expenses, and to pay for extraordinary exother similar
22
penses.
The financial health of common interest communities is
essential to the viability and adequacy of millions of Americans' residences, and to the continued availability of many
traditionally public facilities.
Upon analysis of the association's functions, one clearly
sees the association as a quasi-government entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and responAs a "minisibilities of a municipal government.
government," the association provides to its members, in
almost every case, utility services, road maintenance,
street and common-area lighting, and refuse removal. In
many cases, it also provides security services and various
21. Dowden, supra note 18, at 27, 28; see also id. at 29.
22. ROHAN, supra note 2, at 7-46. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") considers the community association's primary duties to be to maintain and preserve the common property. AM. INST. OF CPAS,
AICPA AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE: COMMON INTEREST REALTY ASSOCIATIONS § 3.01 (1991).
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forms of communication within the community. There is,
moreover, a clear analogy to the municipal police and
public safety functions. All of these functions are financed
through assessments or taxes levied upon members of the
community, with powers vested in the board of directors ... or similar body clearly analogous to the governing
body of a municipality. Terminology varies from region to
region; however the duties and responsibilities remain the
same.

23

To the extent the community association as an institution is vulnerable to financial collapse, facilities essential to
our society will be profoundly threatened. Yet, the financial
health of community associations is, under present law, uncertain and therefore vulnerable to failure. Several problems
contribute to this vulnerability.
A. Complex FinancialManagement Skills Required
First, the economic responsibilities of community associations are complex, often requiring considerable financial
sophistication.
Financial management of association finances involves, among other tasks: overall financial oversight, budgeting, establishment of accounting systems and
financial procedures, determination of regular and special
assessments, collection and disbursement processes, projection of long term financial needs and risks, definition, establishment and management of reserve funds, adequately insuring against risks to the community and to its leadership,
potential negotiation of financing from sophisticated financial
institutions, negotiation and contracting for substantial
maintenance and repair projects, analysis of taxation impacts of association decisions, and preparation of financial
statements. 24 These are daunting tasks which many would
consider beyond their personal sophistication.

23. Wayne Hyatt & James Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development
and Administration of Condominium and Homeowners Associations, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 915, 918 (1976).
24. See generally WAYNE HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 6.03 (2d ed. 1988);
URBAN LAND INST. & COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNERS'

ASSOCIATIONS

ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE].

(2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
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B. Association Politicsand Decisionmaking
Furthermore, financial management must be accomplished in the context of the complexity and explosiveness of
association politics and decision-making. 25 Factors contributing to the volatility of association political life include:
(1) the diversity of backgrounds, interests, stages in the life
cycle, and expectations of community residents; (2) the likelihood of conflicts over complaints about rule-violations by
residents' own children; (3) the omnipresent conflict between
devotion of resources toward future property maintenance
26
and maintenance of lower present assessment levels;
(4) possessive feelings towards each resident's home and
freedoms to behave within that home and its environs as the
resident chooses, which frequently confront detailed regula27
tion of behavior within and around the home;
(5) widespread ignorance and confusion among homeowners
regarding the obligations to which they are subject, 28 often
not freely chosen by these residents when buying into the
community; 29 (6) the threat of changing rules and assessment
levels applicable to association members; 30 and (7) the juxtaposition of the friendship and neighborliness expected among
association members with the conflicts, dissent, assessment
in our soand rule enforcement that are traditionally viewed
31
non-neighborly.
and
unfriendly
ciety as distinctly
Moreover, ill feelings among common interest community residents likely result from a sense of dissolving personal identity for homeowners in these regimes. 32 Association residents often view the association board adversarially,
seeing the board as an arms-length provider of services for
which residents pay dearly, and which intrude upon resi25. See generally Barton & Silverman, supra note 11.
26. This conflict often divides board members, charged by the declaration
and law regulating fiduciaries who serve on boards with the duty of maintaining and enhancing the common areas and overall property values within the
community, and residents who often place highest priority on avoiding additional short-term costs, unburdened by the duties with which the board is
charged.
27. See Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note 10, at 53-55.
28. Id. at 59-61.
29. Id. at 56-59.
30. Id. at 55-56.
31. Barton & Silverman, supra note 11; see also Winokur, Mixed Blessings,
supra note 10, at 65-66.
32. See generally Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note 10, at 66-75.
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dents' activities in their own home. 33 Meanwhile, board
members often feel themselves the targets of abusive criticism by their non-board neighbors in return for working
harder than these critics do on behalf of the community. 34
The tenor of some community association meetings becomes
super-charged, escalating in extreme cases to threatened or
actual violence among association members and board members. 35 Litigation between association boards and their
members has also mushroomed in recent decades. 36
C. Limited ProfessionalCompetencies of Common Interest
Communities
Those making financial decisions for associations are often potentially or actually controlled by association members
and leaders lacking even rudimentary financial sophistication. Association board members are common citizens all too
often lacking in training to manage the associations for
37
which they are responsible.
33. Some of the political conflict within community associations may well
reflect the more general distrust of elected officials and government which has
characterized our society in recent decades.
34. In a California study, for example, only 16% of the surveyed associations characterized association members as giving the board "a lot of support,"
while 45% report dissension. STEPHEN E. BARTON & CAROL J. SILVERMAN,
COMMON INTEREST HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS IN CALIFORNIA: REPORT TO
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE 13 (1987). In addition, 44% of

the associations reported significant harassment of individual board members
within the past year. Id. A Florida study of condominium life found conflict
among residents, and between residents and their associations, to be "common"
and to generate substantial stress and strain on relations within the communities. See generally STEPHEN A. WILLIAMS AND RONALD J. ADAMS, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CONDOMINIUMS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CONDOMINIUM
OWNERS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA (1987). Even the Urban Land Institute

found a "tragedy" of "great dissatisfaction" among common interest community
residents in an early 1970s study of associations in California and Washington,
D.C. CARL NORCROSS, TOWNHOUSES & CONDOMINIUMS: RESIDENTS LIKES AND
DISLIKES 80 (1973). Norcross described residents as "unhappy, resentful, discouraged and disillusioned about their associations." Id. "A considerable number of families are so angry that they are selling their homes and moving
away ... to get away from what they think of as strait-jacket controls on their
lives." Id.
35. See Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note 10, at 63 & n.263.
36. Id. at 63-64.
37. See, eg., WILLIAMS & ADAMS, supra note 34, at 68 (reporting almost
62% of respondents agreeing that most association leaders "lack the technical
training to be effective managers"); BARTON & SILVERMAN, supra note 34, at
12; NORCROSS, supra note 34, at 80, 83-85; Uriel Reichman, ResidentialPrivate
Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 252, 290 (1976); see
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From the inception of the common interest communities

boom of the 1960s, it was contemplated that homeowner
boards would need the expertise of professionals in managing
their communities. Thus, the 1964 Homes Association
Handbook clearly recommended retention of accountant
services to select accounting methods, conduct audits, prepare financial statements and assist with the budget process. 38 At that time, many common interest communities of
more than thirty residences employed paid personnel, with
the percentage rising substantially as community size passed
500 residences. 39 But this same influential authority foresaw
very active member participation in association management
40
of small to moderate communities with common areas.
These projections overestimated the interest and abilities of
homeowners in common interest communities to manage the
41
complexities of community finances and operations.
There was then in existence no national federation of associations, and few local federations as sources of information
and guidance in association leadership. 42 This leadership
also Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 21 (1995). But see Hyatt, supra note 17, at 371-72
(arguing that current association board leadership is amply qualified to manage
their associations, and that standards of conduct are more important than prerequisites of holding office to sound management, yet also recognizing the potential wisdom of separating out the community association of the future's
business role). Hyatt stated:
[A]s new and greater powers are required to meet new needs, especially as some forms of privatization take place. Examples include the
provision of services of a municipal nature, social and educational activities, technological services, and wide variety of other activities ....
Issues of capacity, delegation, provision of individualized services, and
use of technology will be all important. The powers and methods of
operation of the board should be clarified, providing guidance as to
what activities requirements for qualifying for office.
Hyatt, supra note 17, at 378.
Hyatt further suggests association support for serious board training in
management, and notes that personnel trained and experienced in municipal
management make excellent community mangers. There is a need and opportunity for academic institutions to broaden curriculum to include the largescale common interest community. Id. He goes so afar as to suggest that professionalism and compensation are possible components of the future of community association board operations. Id. at 379.
38. See HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 14.51, at 225-26.
39. Id. § 17.41, at 260.
40. Id. § 16.2, at 247.
41. Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note 10, 64-65.
42. See MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 109-10.
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role has since been filled by the Community Associations Institute ("CAI"), creation of which was spurred by the Urban
Land Institute and the National Association of Homebuilders. CAI later came to embrace homeowners, public officials,
43
association managers, attorneys, and accountants.
In recent decades, the complexity of overseeing common
interest community operations and finances has led to the
development of an entire industry of community association
managers, often trained and certified with expertise in the
specialized constellation of common interest community
management functions. 44 Many associations, utilize professional community association managers. 45 However, a disturbingly high number of associations operate without such
46
specialized, professional support.
Association board decisions are often upheld when challenged. 47 However, the proper standard applicable in judicial
43. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 109-20. In its rather slanted history of
CAI, McKenzie is sharply critical of the evolution of CAI as an organization
dominated by experts whose life's work is involved to the administration of
community associations. Id. The present author believes this evolutionthough somewhat limiting CAI's breadth of perspective-has strengthened
CAI's viability, and left it as the premier organization presently able to address
the urgent need association directors (and, not incidentally, public governmental entities which regulate associations) have for expert advice and education in
the complex and sensitive tasks of management.
44. Substantial management designation programs have been administered
by Community Associations Institute ("CAI"). As of June 1997, its affiliate, the
National Board of Certification for Community Association Managers, has designated 2,900 managers nationally as "Certified Manager of Community Associations" ("CMCA's"). ROBERT DIAMOND, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE
ANNUAL REPORT (1996-97). CA has educated, graduated and certified well
over 500 "Professional Community Association Managers" ("PCAMs"), and
which more recently commenced as less comprehensive training and certification program for designation of "AssociationManagement Specialist"("AMS").
CAI FACTBOOK, supra note 3, at 26. CA's Professional Management Development Program currently offers 101 community associations management
course offerings nationally, which were attended by over 1,700 registrants
during 1996-97. DIAMOND, supra note 44.
45. See CAI FACTBOOK, supra note 3 (suggesting that, in 1990, among
Community Associations Institute member associations, about two-thirds of
community associations employed on-site professional staff or community associations management companies to manage their associations, with the trend
during the late 1980s being more and more toward management by specialized
management companies).
46. The same study reflects, however, that over a quarter of responding associations relied solely on volunteer management. Id.
47. Regarding decisions involving assessments and collection, for example,
see ROHAN, supra note 2, at 7-22, noting that most challenges to association to
even special assessments are unsuccessful, especially where the association
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review of a board's decision is still often uncertain as a matter of law, 48 potentially adding to board members' uncertainty regarding the scope of their power to act when they
are called upon to do so.
The association's financial management task is rendered
does not fail to follow its own articles of incorporation, bylaws, rules. For
authority more generally supportive of board actions, see the discussion of the
business judgment rule, see infra note 48.
48. Cases and commentary addressing challenges to community association
board actions have disagreed the proper standard of review. For helpful and
contrasting recent overviews of the current debate, see Hyatt, supra note 17, at
342-55, and Reporter's Note to RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD): PROPERTY
(SERVITUDES), TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 7, § 6:13 (Apr. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Reporter'sNote, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY]. While analysis of this controversy

is beyond the scope of this article some further explanation may be helpful.
Among the central points of controversy is whether and when association decisions should be presumptively protected from challenge by some version of the
"business judgment rule" versus some less protective "reasonableness" rule. As
Hyatt describes it, the "business judgment rule" approach sees the board as the
sole arbiter of issues to which this approach is applied, provided that the procedure under which the decision was made is valid. Hyatt, supra note 17, at
345-46. Thus, the judicial inquiry rebuttably presumes that a board member
made a challenged decision based on adequate information, and in a good faith
effort to serve the interests of the community the board governs. Id. For an
example of the application of this business judgment approach to upholding an
assessment, see Dockside Association, Inc. v. Detyens, 362 S.E.2d 874 (S.C.
1987). Hyatt sees the reasonableness rule as a higher standard of review, and
points up contrasting views among authorities. He asserts that a reasonableness standard of review is a "major component" of community association law,
noting that it has been applied and advocated especially in cases involving the
association's regulation of its own membership. Hyatt, supra note 17, at 34854. By contrast, the Restatement's Reporter's Note takes a somewhat contrasting view. Describing the present law governing member challenges of association actions as "somewhat confusing and unsatisfactory," Reporter's Note,
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra, at 328, and noting the "business judgment"
vs. "reasonableness" schism among the courts, id. at 329, the Restatement's
Reporter's Note suggests that both rules are generally substantively similar in
consistently limiting review to whether challenged actions were ultra vires,
made in bad faith, or by interested directors, or were arbitrary, capricious, or
discriminatory. Id.
For examples of cases taking the "business judgment" approach to challenges of board decisions, see the leading case of Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave.
Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990); see also, Tulluride Lodge Ass'n v.
Zline, 707 P.2d 998 (Colo. App. 1987); Leppaluoto v. Warm Springs Hollow
Homeowners Ass'n, 752 P.2d 605 (Idaho, 1988); Farrington v. Casa Solana
Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 517 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1987). For examples of decisions using the "reasonableness" approach, see Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v.
Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Ct. App. 1981), Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v.
Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. App. 1981), Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium
Owners Ass'n, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App. 1983), and Kellogg Commons
Condominium Ass'n v. Carlington, No. 93 L048, 1994 WL 102244, at *1 (Ohio
App. 1994).
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all the more overwhelming to untrained, volunteer leadership because of the sheer size of financial sums involved in
even "routine" management tasks. Thus, even modest communities are often responsible for annual association budgets
of hundreds of thousands of dollars. 49
III. ASSESSING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TOOLS AVAILABLE
TO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS

A Budgeting
An association budget process is essential to financial
operation of a common interest community. This process
should occur at least annually, 50 and serves as both an informational tool for residents as well as a management tool
for resource allocation and control. 5 1 The process must estimate the likely expenses for the coming year, including the
expense of funding reserve accounts for future extraordinary
expenditures for repair and replacement of long term assets

49. A Raleigh, North Carolina CPA who regularly served dozens of condominium and homeowner associations in the past 10 years estimates the average
annual budgets of these associations as ranging from $100,000-$200,000, with
some ranging as high as $500,000. Interview with Layne H. Laughlin, CPA,
Denver, Colorado (Feb. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Laughlin Interview]. Of course,
many larger associations, especially in larger and more sophisticated markets,
would have budgets far larger than these. Id.; cf. CAI FACTBOOK, supra note 3,
at 22 (asserting that in 1991 the average annual association budget for all associations was $122,508, and the average of all association members of CAI was
$218,000).
50. ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24, at 8-9. Note
that association leaders will be working with at least five different administrative types of years: calendar year, contract year(s), fiscal year(s) (which may
vary for tax and financial purposes) and association board electoral year. Id.
Setting each of these management years can involve some delicate issues, particularly regarding how they relate to each other. For example, it may be wisest to set the electoral year to commence before the fiscal year and the budget
process which governs it begins. Otherwise, newly elected board members are
left to administer the budget reflecting policies shaped by the prior board.
Boards may wish to schedule their fiscal years to vary from tax years, so that
the association's accountant will be more available for consultation than she
might otherwise be during "tax season." Depending on the work involved in
renewing or renegotiating contracts, it may become advisable to stagger various contract years to allow greater board focus on different respective contracts
at different times of the year. Boards seeking community participation in the
budget process might elect to avoid scheduling the process for summer months,
when most residents are likely to be away. The summer is also likely to be a
midpoint for contract years related to maintenance and recreation services. Id.
51. Id. at 3.
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of the community.5 2
Aside from long term reserve issues, the process of estimating expenses can be both substantial and complex.
Evaluation of current association programs, employees, and
contractors requires detailed consideration of effectiveness
and fairness to both recipients and providers of association
funds. 53 Inspection of the community's physical components
and discussion with maintenance staff will be needed to determine what repairs or replacements might be needed differently from the previous year.54 Ideally, costs to the association should be compared with costs charged by competing
providers of similar services.
The association's management might also consider surveying residents as to the quality and importance of various
association facilities and activities. 55 Such surveys would
alert the board to potential unknown conditions and their associated costs while educating the community about the
funds needed to provide services. It can also fuel decisions to
establish, maintain, restore, improve or cancel programs of
the association. On the other hand, soliciting homeowner
opinions and evaluation could open difficult political subjects,
since residents may predictably seek improved or increased
service when the questions are posed separate from the costs
unit owners will be forced to bear in order to effectuate the
changes.5 6 Also, membership opinion often generates a deFor a discussion of reserves, see infra Part III.C.1.
See ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24, at 28.
See ROHAN, supra note 2, at 7-47.
For an example of such a survey form, see ULI/CAI FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24, at 12-16. This form could easily be supplemented to provide residents more information than it does regarding the
costs of programs they are asked to evaluate and prioritize.
56. For example, consider the situation of a Denver association, where an
association task force, with the support of strong community opinion, recommended replacement of an aging, though heavily utilized swimming pool which
economic studies had clearly shown would be cheaper than the increasing
maintenance costs the old pool would require in the coming years. Interview
with Lynn Jordan, Esq., Special Counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll,
LLP, Denver, Colorado (Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Jordan Interview]. Because
construction of the new pool required a special assessment (special assessments
are discussed below, see infra Part III.B), the assessment was put to a community vote, and the same membership which had supported the improvement in
concept rejected the assessment. Jordan Interview, supra. The politics were
unpleasant, and the board found themselves in an awkward dilemma where
neither replacement nor standing pat seemed acceptable to their constituents.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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sire by board members to respond quickly, where the better
impact of such input would be to trigger a carefully considered analysis of how best to meet the expressed concern.
Among the items typically covered by the annual budget
would be: utilities water, landscaping and grounds maintenance, exterior repairs, recreational expenses, payroll, management, legal and accounting fees, insurance, telephone,
communication and newsletters, miscellaneous contingency
fees, and contributions to reserves for extraordinary ex57
penses.
Careful analysis is required on the income side. As potential costs increase, assessment increases are required to
cover these increments,58 unless other income sources are
available, such as program 59 or user fees, 60 interest, or other
income. Thus, the board must assess community willingness
and ability to pay higher assessments. Absent increased assessments when costs rise, services may need to be cur61
tailed.
Despite the obvious importance of sound budgeting processes, there is little law mandating any budget process in
common interest communities. Considering that association
boards are largely composed of unsophisticated and uncompensated residents, the absence of even minimal mandatory
processes is a major financial vulnerability of this country's
common interest communities.
57. Laughlin Interview, supra note 49.

58. Reserve funds are sometimes used to pay these increments, but this
likely defeats the essential purpose of reserve funding, and has constituted a
widespread problem in community association finance. See discussion infra
Part III.C.1.
59. These would include fees for special programs authorized by the association, including the rental of community facilities.
60. Typically these would include fees for use of recreational or fitness facilities by community residents or, conceivably, outsiders. These fees may be
proscribed in the declaration or bylaws, and can raise interesting challenges for
association managers such as determining appropriate fees, and collection and
tracking the fees. Among potential programs that might generate such fees are
adult education classes, child care, fitness or athletic activities, each involving
value only to the participants rather than the community at large. ULI/CAI
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24, at 74-75.
61. Cf. Griffith v. Rittenhouse Park Community Ass'n, 521 A.2d 1377 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). The court approved a cutback in otherwise obligatory association services following the community's vote to deny an increase in
assessments to provide income for operations which had become more costly.
Id. The court considered the board's obligation to keep the association solvent
even more important than its obligation to provide promised services. Id.
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Budget processes may be mandated in association documents prepared by the developer's attorneys, especially if
they are experienced with community associations. In states
which have adopted the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA") (or its more limited companion statutes), 62 however, a budget is required to be adopted at least
annually, once the first association assessment has been
made. 63 The special priority accorded by UCIOA to a portion
of association assessment liens 64 is limited to the extent it is

based on such a budget. 65 Under UCIOA, the association
board is expected to adopt a budget, which it then circulates
to all community residents along with notice of an opportunity to meet and review the proposal. 66 The budget is considered ratified under UCIOA unless a majority of all unit owners (or any larger majority specified in the declaration) reject
the budget. In the event of such a rejection, the previous association budget and assessment level already in effect continues until a new budget is ratified in this manner. 67 Unless
the budget reflects egregious problems, its rejection under
this procedure is unlikely because it requires extensive initiative by association members, who are typically difficult to
mobilize. 68
B. GeneralAssessments
1. Background
Community associations fund their common interest operations through assessments. 69 While the financial strength
of these communities requires the unconditional payment of
assessments, enforceable as a unilateral promise, the flow of
assessment dollars will naturally be subject to the personal
62. See supra note 1.
63. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-115(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 598 (1997).
64. See infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
assessment lien. For in depth analysis of the lien and related measures, see
Winokur, Meaner LienorAssociations, supra note 1.
65. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 600 (1997).
66. Id. § 3-103(c), at 576.
67. Id.
68. Compare Winokur, Mixed Blessing, supra note 10, at 62 n.259 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., ROHAN, supra note 2, § 7A.03[4], at 7A-29-30.
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financial condition of owners, the overall economic condition
of the geographic area, and the political climate of the association. When boards sense their constituents are experiencing hard times economically, understandably they would
often hesitant to raise or strictly enforce assessment obligations.
When mandatory owner's associations are created to
govern covenant-controlled communities, assessment parameters are typically defined and limited by the Declaration70 creating the common interest community. Since the
Declaration is drawn up by the developer before marketing of
residences in the community begins, the developer can be
expected often to focus primarily on the competitive position
of his or her development in the market for new homes in establishing a monthly assessment.
Thus, the assessed
amount would often be based more upon what the market
would bear than on a realistic analysis of what the promised
and required community services would actually cost. As a
result, the services which could be paid for by the mandated
assessments, as well as the quality of these services, all too
often seem based upon an earlier relatively short term developer concern for how to sell the most homes in the least
amount of time.
Financial institutions counted on to finance home purchases within a given community would naturally want assurance that these assessments would not escalate excessively, overburdening their borrowers (or the lenders
themselves, should they be forced to take ownership of units
via foreclosure 7l). Thus, future assessment increases are often expressly limited to their original amount, or by a maximum of increases in a consumer price or other analogous index specified in the Declaration. Such provisions often confer
the ability to increase assessments above that ceiling upon a
vote of the owners, which are notoriously difficult to obtain.
70. For purposes of this discussion, the recorded instrument creating the
servitude regime is referred to as the "Declaration." However, in many states
common interest communities are created by recorded instruments under other
names (e.g., "master deed").
71. On assessment burdens of mortgagees face when obtaining common interest communities units in foreclosure, see GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 965 (2d ed. 1985); Robert Zinman, Condominium
Investments and the Institutional Lender - A Review, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
749,754 (1974).
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Such assessment-increase ceilings have been a major
impediment to common interest communities' ability to implement sound fiscal policies, and the raising of necessary
funds for operations which would vary over the years due to
factors independent of the ceiling imposed in the declaration.
For example, besides increased costs due to more general
market-wide inflation, maintenance costs for which the assooften increase with the age of an
ciation is responsible will
72
asset to be maintained.
While the payment of assessments may presently be
more akin to the payment of taxes, the lifeblood of these
communities has flowed slowly as every stakeholder has attempted to minimize payment of assessments. Lenders frequently exhibit reluctance to foreclose in order to avoid liability for assessments.7 3 The practical result is that an
associations' fiscal strength is limited by the developer's concern for the sales shortly after drafting the declarations, the
developer's limited foresight of the long-term, the lending
community's need for certainty, and for limiting their borrowers burdens, and the immediate goal of many homeowners to spend as little as possible in the operations of their
communities.
The impact of assessment-limiting provisions is greatest
when the community is financially weak. For example, as
the economic health of an area declines, so, too, would successful assessment collection. The association must spend
additional funds in collecting assessments using often more
active and costly procedures (e.g., lien foreclosure and receiverships). When association assessments go uncollected, the
defaulting residents' unpaid expense share falls on the
neighbors in good standing, and the more reliable owners
now face greater difficulty in meeting their own financial obligations to the community. 74 These owners, in turn, experi72. Compare the swimming pool example described supra note 56, where
the age of the pool made it a progressively more expensive asset to maintain.
As in this actual example, replacement of the asset will sometimes be the less
expensive and more value-enhancing strategy for the association. But ceilings
on assessment increases and prohibitions of special assessments may preclude
this optimal alternative.
73. See supra note 71.
74. Phillip Gregory, The California Condominium Bill, 14 HASTINGS L.J.
189, 204 (1963); Henry Judy & Robert Wittie, Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 437, 481, (1978); John Walbran, Condominium, Its Economic Functions, 30 MO. L. REV. 531, 554-55
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ence stronger pressure to default on the now-increased assessments, while their homes are devalued by the very same
assessment increases-closing off their potential escape from
the destructive cycle within the common interest community.75 However, assessment ceilings may block associations
from increasing assessments to offset losses due to defaults.
Rather than raising assessments as defaults increase, an
association can instead opt to decrease maintenance below
the levels they would otherwise perform. This strategy of deferred maintenance, if carried on for any significant period, is
also self-defeating because it accelerates the deterioration of
community facilities-eventually raising maintenance costs
and inevitably lowering the values of homes in the community which depend on the common facilities. 76 As more common interest communities age, these problems will only increase in severity.7 7 As the cycle repeats, the problems
intensify until the community confronts financial disaster.
2. Legal Aspects of Assessment
The law has provided mixed responses to the risk of assessments-the lifeblood of common interest community operations-remaining uncollected. On the positive side, courts
widely recognize residents' assessment obligations as covenants which run with the land. 78 Where assessment provi-

sions are contained in Declarations, 79 this result is straightforward.80
Courts typically find personal liability for
assessments arising during an owner's ownership of a common interest community residence in cases of such real covenants or equitable servitudes.8 ' Even where currently bind(1965).
75. Judy & Wittie, supra note 74, at 482.
76. Winokur, Meaner LienorAssociations, supra note 1, at 359-60.
77. Id.
78. The classic decision was Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938). See also Stream Sports
Club v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1983); Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 528 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1975); Mendrop v. Harrell, 103 So. 2d
418 (Miss. 1958); Henlopen Acres v. Potter, 127 A.2d 911 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
1971); and ROAN, supra note 2, § 9.02, at 9-4-7.
79. See, e.g., FHA Form 1401 (VA Form 26-8201), Art. IV, § 1.
80. Stream Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1983); Kell
v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Assn., 528 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1975); Stephens Co. v. Lisk, 82 S.E.2d 99 (N.C. 1954); see also Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
81. See generally ROBERT NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASsO-
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ing written assessment covenants are not included in the
documentation, courts generally have little difficulty finding
unit owner liability to contribute via assessment to the common good conferred on properties within a common interest
82
community under quasi-contract or analogous theory. Assessment obligations are also imposed by statutes in several
83
states.
Courts have usually supported association fiscal strength
by holding the assessment obligation of members to be inde84
pendent of the association's actual performance of services.
Indeed, there is statutory support for this reasonable view as
well. 85 Thus, the community member's obligation is uncondi-

tional-without regard to an owner's satisfaction with services or whether an owner is pleased with the manner in
which association funds are spent. A common interest community owner owes assessments simply by owning property
in the community, much like the owner of land in a municipality owes real estate taxes unconditionally.
CIATIONS § 6.1.2.3 (1989); e.g., Harbison Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Mueller, 459
S.E.2d 860 (S.C. App. 1995), cert. denied; Chateaux Condominiums v. Daniels,
754 P.2d 425 (Colo. App. 1988); cf. Chesapeake Ranch Club, Inc. v. C.R.C.
United Members, Inc., 483 A.2d 1334 (Md. App. 1984) (finding that the assessment of liability running with the land may not include all fees imposed by the
association).
82. See Nevel v. Shelter Island Heights Property Owners Corp., 613
N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. 1994); Meadow Run & Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. Berkel,
598 A.2d 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 610 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1992);
Seaview Ass'n. of Fire Island, N.Y. v. Williams, 510 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1987);
Perry v. Bridgetown Community Ass'n, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1230 (Miss. 1986);
Weatherby Lake, Improvement Co. v. Sherman, 611 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1980);
Island Improvement Ass'n v. Ford, 383 A.2d 133 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1978); Mohegan Colony Ass'n v. Picone, 402 N.Y.S.2d 40 (N.Y. 1978).
83. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 524(a) (West 1994); see also UNIF.

COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-115, 7 U.L.A. 598-99 (1997); Blood v.

Edgar's Inc., 632 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (interpreting and applying
the Massachusetts statute imposing assessment liability).
84. See, e.g., Kay v. Via Verde Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 677 So. 2d 337 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Panther Lake Homeowner's Ass'n v. Juergensen, 887 P.2d
465 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Park Place Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Naber, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 51 (Ct. App. 1994); Abbey Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Bowen, 508
So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Homsey v. University Gardens Racquet
Club, 730 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App. 1987); Pooser v. Lovett Square Townhomes
Owners' Ass'n, 702 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App. 1985); Newport West Condominium
Ass'n v. Veniar, 350 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Casita De Castilian, Inc.
v. Kamrath, 629 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1981). But see Kirktown Homes Ass'n v. Arey,
812 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
85.

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-80(d) (1997); Forest Villas Condominium

Ass'n v. Camerio, 442 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. App. 1992).
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This fact does not give the association carte blanche in
assessing unit owners. The board is limited by both the
common interest community's governing documents8 6 and
any applicable state law.8 7 Discrimination in application of

assessments among residential units, except as expressly
contemplated in the declaration, is typically invalid. 88
The difficulty with assessments as a source of fiscal
strength is not the non-existence of basic assessment liability
on the part of common interest community residents.
Rather, it is, the difficulties in collecting those assessments
when residents default on their obligations, particularly in
bad economic times.
Typically, common interest community declarations impose a lien on behalf of the community association to secure
payment of any delinquent or unpaid assessments.8 9
UCIOA90 and many state statutes impose the lien regardless
of the absence of such language in the declaration. 91 Although some common law authority gives these liens priority
over all individual unit mortgages, 92 many state statutes 93
86. See, e.g., Westbridge Condominium Ass'n v. Lawrence, 554 A.2d 1163
(D.C. 1989); Johnson v. Fairfax Village Condominium IV Unit Owners Ass'n,
548 A.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
87.

See, eg., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 512 (West 1994).

88. See, eg., Thanasoulis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, 542 A.2d 900 (N.J.
1988); Lion Square Phase II and III Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Hask, 700 P.2d
932 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). Compare Theiss v. Island House Ass'n, Inc., 311 So.
2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) with Casita de Castilaion, Inc. v. Kamrath, 629
P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). For a useful discussion of the general problem
of association discriminatory regulation as between different residences within
its community appears, see ROGER BERNHARDT & MICHAEL GOLDEN, 1997

SUPPLEMENT TO ROBERT NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS

§ 4.4.4. (1989).

89. See, e.g., NATELSON, supra note 81, at 216.
90.

UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.

600-03 (1997).
91. See, eg., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 33-1256 (West 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1367 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 718.116 (1989); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 514A-90 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAws § 559.208 (1990); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 339(z) (McKinney 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.18 (Anderson
1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.709 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-516 (Michie 1990);
WIS. STAT. § 703.16 (West 1981).
92. Mendrop v. Harrell, 103 So. 2d 418 (Miss. 1958); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Wetzel, 248 N.W.2d 791 (Wis. 1933).
93. See Federal Housing Administration Form #3285: Model Statute for
Creation of Apartment Ownership (FHA Model Act) (reprinted with commentary in PENNEY ET AL., LAND FINANCING: CASES & MATERIALS, 580-92 (3d ed.
1984)) (providing that the association lien for assessments is subordinate to any
'first mortgage of record"); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-20 (1990); VA.
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and declaration provisions effectively make the assessment
lien subject to at least some mortgages secured by the same
unit-particularly the first mortgage secured by the land. As
a result, an association's assessment lien generates little or
no money for the association in such foreclosure proceedings,
particularly in the hard economic times when94 associations
will most desperately need assessment revenue.
Facing this bleak collection prospect in the event of foreclosure, especially in the states where foreclosure is judicially
conducted, associations opt for an action on the member's
personal debt obligation for delinquent assessments generated during his or her ownership of the residence. This process may be faster and less expensive, though it is usually
most effective for brief delinquencies which total no more
than the jurisdictional limit of the applicable small claims
court.

95

The problem of realizing on defaulted assessments and
the liens which secure them is somewhat lessened in states
97
96
adopting the standard lien priority and related provisions
of UCIOA (or its sibling Uniform Laws). 98 These "super priCODE ANN. § 55-79.85 (Michie 1990); Brask v. Bank of St. Louis, 553 S.W.2d
223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 60 § 524 (West 1970); see generally GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 965 (2d ed.

1985).
94. See generally Winokur, supra note 9, at 357-59. Unlike some other
lienors, the association may be particularly hard pressed to purchase the property by "bidding it in" at a foreclosure sale. Id. The association's lien is typically sufficiently small as to allow very little of the bid the be, in effect, on the
credit of its outstanding lien. Id. And the association may have inadequate resources to manage, rent or sell the residence, foregoing assessment income
from that unit until a new purchaser other than the association itself succeeds
to ownership. See Benny Kass & Donald Dyekman, Assessment Collection, in
THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW SEMINAR 337, 343

(1990).
95. Kass & Dyekman, supra note 94, at 342.
96. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 600 (1997).
97. Id. § 3-102(a)(11), at 573.
98. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act was adopted in 1982
(and amended in 1994) by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws ("ULC"), as a single, comprehensive law combining the ULC's prior
uniform laws in this area: the Uniform Condominium Act (ULC, 1980), the
Uniform Planned Community Act (ULC, 1980), the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act (ULC, 1981). Prefatory Note to UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP
ACT (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 472 (1997). According to the PrefatoryNote, by 1994,
UCIOA had been adopted in at least five states, while the Uniform Condominium Act, or substantially similar laws, exist twenty-one states. The Uniform
Planned Community Act is the law in one state. Id.
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ority" lien provisions 99 provide a limited first priority for up
to six months of unpaid assessments over almost all other
liens, including "a first security interest on the unit recorded
before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent." 100 This priority may include fines
and, when the statute so specifies,10 1 enforcement and attorneys fees. The "super priority" accorded assessment liens
under UCIOA has proved acceptable to federal governmental
agencies and the secondary lending markets. 102
In addition to giving community associations a sharealbeit a limited share-of the sale proceeds when residences
in common interest communities are foreclosed, the more important consequence of limited "super-priority" for a portion
of association assessment defaults may be in providing the
association much needed leverage in getting the property
more quickly into a status where it is generating regular assessment revenues. This may be by bringing a property in
default more quickly into foreclosure, leading to purchase by
a solvent owner (often the senior mortgagee), or by encouraging the senior mortgagee to pay assessments it might not
technically be obligated to pay in order to gain control over
the timing and mode of foreclosure. 108 Another advantage to
super priority accorded to portions of association assessment
liens is that its permanently renewable aspect may practically induce the senior mortgagee to pay the entire delinquency on residences in assessment default. 0 4
Among the paramount interests secured by common interest community residences, as with other property, are
"liens for real estate taxes and other government assessments or charges against the unit." 05 Indeed, an argument
can be made that common interest community assessmentsall assessments, and not just the most recent six months in
99. For comprehensive analysis of the need for and consequences of the super priority assessment lien under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act, see generally Winokur, MeanerLienor Associations, supra note 1.
100. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 600 (1997).
101. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 38-33.3-316(1) (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 47-258 (1991).
102. See ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.05[4], at 9-30.
103. See Winokur, Meaner Lienor Associations, supra note 1, at 379-80.

104. See id. at 379-85.
105. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (b) (1994), 7 pt. 1

U.L.A. 600 (1997).
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default-should be appropriately prioritized as superior to
even a first lien on each residence because the assessments
are needed to fund facilities and services for the public in
much the same sense as those financed by public government
10 6
property taxes.
Furthermore, the burden for such assessments, which
such a rule would place on private mortgage lenders, would
not be so out of line with lender burdens where an owner in a
non-common interest community residence defaults on the
secured loan. After foreclosure, the lender will typically own
the property, at least for a time. 10 7 Prior to foreclosure, the
lender will be forced to protect its security, often paying costs
of casualty insurance, security, exterior maintenance and
payment of the normally senior charges for property taxes on
the security. 0 8 As between the lender and the association,
both of which are creditors secured by the same residence,
the lender has typically been in the stronger position in selecting its debtor in the first place and obtaining insurance
assuring payment of its debt-unlike the association, which
has less opportunity to protect debts which go to fund what
are essentially public facilities. 0 9
A serious problem with collecting admittedly valid common interest community assessments has been bankruptcy
law governing situations where a community member declares bankruptcy." 0 As with several of the community association fiscal problems discussed above, this problem would
be most acute during hard economic times, when common interest community members are least able to pay assessments, especially assessments increased by their neighbors'
assessment defaults. Of course, it would during such hard
times that bankruptcies among community members would
be highest.
106. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., ROBERT LIFTON, PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE: LEGAL TAX AND
BUSINESS STRATEGIES 262-63 (1979); William Prather, A Realistic Approach to
Foreclosure,14 BUS. LAW. 132, 135 (1958).
108. See Winokur, Meaner Lienor Associations, supra note 1, at 360-61, and

authorities cited therein.
109. See id. at 361.
110. See generally Denise L. Palmieri & M. Edward Burns, Protecting Community Association Assessments in Bankruptcy, 8 PROB. & PROP. 26 (1994)

(addressing community association strategies prior to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994); see also infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text for discussion
regarding the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
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In such bankruptcies, the community association has
faced the risk that its valid assessment debts will be discharged under federal bankruptcy law. Under a community
member's liquidation in bankruptcy,"' an automatic stay
triggered by the filing of the bankruptcy petition prevents
creditors from collecting debts. 112 Once the bankruptcy estate has been applied to the debtor's liabilities, most of the
debtor's remaining debts are discharged, protecting the
debtor from liability on pre-petition debts. 113
These automatic stay and discharge provisions have
been applied to bankrupt common interest community members' assessment debts, generating controversy whether postpetition assessments are swept away by the bankruptcy discharge. 114 Several bankruptcy courts had included all predischarge assessments-including those arising between the
initial bankruptcy petition and discharge-within the debts
so discharged, 15 primarily because they are based on prepetition contracts. However, some courts have reached the
conclusion that post-petition assessments were not dischargeable, viewing each assessment as a separate incident
of debt, and reasoning that only such incidents preceding the
bankruptcy petition were discharged. 1 6 Association rights
have also been recognized in other decisions holding postpetition assessments recoverable from the bankruptcy trustee as administrative expenses." 7 Where the bankrupt resident seeks reorganization rather than liquidation, some
111. See generally ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.06[l], at 9-32-33.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). Violation by a creditor of this automatic stay
may place the association in contempt, and subject it to monetary penalties.
See, e.g., In re O'Mara, 141 B.R. 237 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1994).
114. See generally ROHAN, supra note 2, § 9.06[3], at 9-36-39.
115. See In re Cohen, 122 B.R. 755 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991); In re Rosteck, 99
B.R. 400 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), affd 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Elias
98 B.R. 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Turner, 101 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D. Utah
1989); In re Behrens, 87 B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); see also In re Montoya, 95 B.R. 511 (S.D. Ohio 1988); cf. In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989) (reactivating liability for post-petition assessments after the debtor is in
possession of the common interest community residence).
116. See, e.g., In re O'Mara, 141 B.R. 237 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992), In re
Raymond, 129 B.R. 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Wetherby, CIV. No. 87-B00429 1989 WL 110796, at *1 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 3, 1989); In re Horton, 87
B.R. 650 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); In re Strelsky, 46 B.R. 178 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985); In re Stern, 44 B.R. 15 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
117. In re Hill, 100 B.R. 907 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989); Rink v. Timers Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 87 B.R. 653 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987).
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courts have recognized scenarios where community associa118
tions could recover post-petition assessments.
Association rights to collect assessments on a common
interest community residence whose owner becomes bankrupt improved after enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994.19 The Bankruptcy Reform Act included the following addition to the Bankruptcy Code's catalogue of debts that
20
are nondischargeable by a bankruptcy decree:
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable
after the order for relief to a membership association
with respect to -the debtor's interest in a dwelling unit
that has condominium ownership or in a share of cooperative housing corporation, but only if such fee or
assessment is payable for a period during which
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in
the condominium or cooperative project; or
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant
and received payments from the tenant for such
period,
but nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for a period arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending or subsequent
121
bankruptcy case.
Although the reform strengthened the position of condominium and cooperative associations in many states, it does
not protect all post-petition assessments from discharge, is
inapplicable to pre-petition assessments, and inapplicable to
122
most Chapter 13 reorganizations.
Faced with enforcement difficulties in collecting assessments, some associations resort to self-help. Courts are divided on whether associations may cut off services or access
118. In re Harvey, 88 B.R. 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Case, 91 B.R.
102 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re Lenz, 90 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
119. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994).
120. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16). This provision applies to Chapter 7 liquidations,
and to Chapter 11 reorganizations where the debtor is, as will usually be true
in community associations assessment cases, an individual. 11 U.S.C. §
1141(d)(2). It applies to reorganizations under Chapter 13 only when the discharge is a "hardship" discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).
122. See infra notes text accompanying notes 197-98.

1162

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

to common amenities to residents who are delinquent on assessments. 123 Clearly, language in the declaration providing
for extra-judicial steps can be helpful to establish association
124
self-help powers.
C. Planningfor Future Costs, Contingenciesand Community
Upgrades
In the life of a community association, it is foreseeable
that the association will from time to time encounter major,
urgent financial demands. The exact timing and extent of
these demands is difficult to project. Common facilities, like
all improvements to realty, typically have limited useful lives
and will periodically require major renovation or replacement. Some facilities may be mere amenities like swimming
pools or clubhouses. Other facilities are necessary infrastructure, such as community roads and drainage, and may
be an integral part of individual residences. 125 Casualty
losses may damage the community severely, without forewarning. A community association may perceive an urgent
need to expand or upgrade its amenities to keep values of
homes it represents competitive with homes in the surrounding area.
Association management must perform its budgeting
and set and collect its assessments with such potential future
developments in mind. No one can know in advance what
costs will be demanded, or when. It is inescapable that some
exigencies will arise and that the association must be able to
respond with urgently needed cash while keeping itself fiscally sound.
1. Reserves
From the outset of the common interest communities
boom of the 1960s, proponents have contemplated that community associations would maintain reserves for replacement
of capital assets,'126 and as working capital. 127 By 1992, funds
123. Compare San Antonio Villa del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller, 761
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App. 1988), with Western v. Chardonnay Village Condominium Ass'n, 519 So. 2d 243 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
124. See, e.g., Chardonnay Village, 519 So. 2d 243; Lonon v. Board of Dir. of
Fairfax Condominium IV Unit Owners Ass'n, 535 A.2d 1386 (D.C. 1988).
125. A classic example would be the roof or structural elements of a residential condominium building.
126. See HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 14.52, at 226-27.
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in common interest community reserve accounts had reached
an estimated $5 billion, 128 and reserve accounts constituted
the single budget category which led to the most assessment
increases. 129 CAI has devoted substantial efforts to encouraging the study of reserve needs, and the maintenance of reserve funds for major, contingent future expenses. 130 Indeed,
some state courts and legislatures consider the maintenance
obligations of
of capital reserves as among the important
13
community associations management. '
In their handbook on financial management of community associations, 32 CAI and the Urban Land Institute
("ULI") have argued for programmed, long-term accumulation of reserve funds as the preferred financing method for
significant capital expenses. 33 Their argument is twopronged.
First, large amounts of money needed for repair or replacement of capital assets or for operational problems, will
be difficult to raise from sources other than existing reserve
funds. 134 Members will inevitably resist sharp assessment
increases, some because their own incomes are fixed, some
because they plan on moving out of the community before realizing the benefit of the expenditure. 135 Also, lenders may
well consider the lack of reserve funds a financial weakness
of associations seeking to borrow cash urgently needed for
36
repair, replacement or operational reasons.
127. See id. § 14.53, at 227-28.
128. CAI FACTBOOK, supra note 3, at inside cover.
129. Id. at 23.
130. See generally, e.g., COMMUNITY ASSNS INST., RESERVE TO PRESERVE

(1984).
131. See, e.g., Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 171 Cal.
Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1981); see also infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
132. ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24.

133. Id. at 102-05.
134. Id. at 102-03.

135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Benny Kass, Saving for a Rainy Day, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
1997, at Ell. Kass, a respected community association law practitioner, argues

that lenders investigate a community association's reserve studies and funding
in deciding whether to finance individual home purchases within a community
association.
GUIDELINES

Id.;
FOR

see

also

RICHARD

COMMUNITY

WYNDHAMSMITH,

ASSOCIATIONS,

RESERVE

PLANNED

STUDY

COMMUNITIES,

CONDOMINIUMS 6 (1989). This practice has not yet become standard for many
lenders in this situation, though analysis of reserves can be expected to become
more regularly part of evaluating community associations property as security

for financing in the years ahead. Lenders are currently less likely to analyze
association reserves in communities "less-sophisticated" in the operation of
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Second, fairness would seem to require members to pay
137
for the association's capital assets as they "consume" them.
Unlike public governments, community associations should
operate on a "pay as you go" basis. 138 Unlike public governments, which often assume a perpetually expanding tax base
as a municipality grows, community associations are gener39
ally constituted to preclude such future growth.
Reserve studies evaluating the condition of capital assets
and projecting repair and replacement costs should be performed every few years for each community association. 40 A
sub-industry of reserve specialists conducting such studies
has developed. CAI recommends retention of a specialist to
perform reserve studies, and has established a special designation for specialized reserve study providers qualified by
experience, background, work, product, references and continuing experience.' 4 ' The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants requires its members to disclose, as
"unaudited supplementary information" in common interest
community audits, estimates of future costs of common capital assets and the extent of actual reserves funds accumulated. 142 If such information is not provided by an association
to the auditor, its absence is to be prominently reported, even
common interest communities. Laughlin Interview, supra note 49.
137. The Homes Association Handbook, supra note 8, takes a similar view,

except in cases where improvements being used prior to eventual replacement
have, themselves, been financed by borrowing and are therefore already being
paid for by those users via assessments which include debt service for the prior
financing. In such cases, the Homes Association Handbook still recommends

maintenance of reserves to account for the gap (due to inflation) between the
cost of the original assets and their eventual replacement costs. HOMES
ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, § 14.52, at 226-27.
138. ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24.
139. For a summary of the debate, see ULI/CAI Financial Management

Guide, supra note 50, at 103.
140. Reserve studies are typically conducted on a two to four year cycle,
though more frequent studies are often recommended or required to reflect, for
example, changes in the property, construction cost fluctuations and unpredictable weather. John P. Poehlman, Updating Your Reserve Study, COMMON

GROUND, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 28.
141.

See RESERVE FUNDING & RESERVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 9 (Mitchell

Frumkin & Christopher Juall eds., 3d ed. 1998); see also WYNDHAMSMITH, supra note 136, at 9.
142.

AM. INST. OF CPAS, AICPA AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE: COMMON

INTEREST REALTY ASSOCIATIONS § 4.30 (1991). There is no requirement that
such studies be conducted by professional engineers; the association board may
instead base its estimated costs on consultations with licensed contractors. Id.
§ 4.30 n.10.
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if neither state statutes nor the association's governing
143
documents require reserve studies or funding.
These studies-which include physical analysis of the
association's facilities and financial analysis of maintenance
and replacement costs 144 -must somehow account for the inevitable increase in replacement cost over the cost of the
original asset, during its useful life. Within the field, there is
debate between those who would attempt to project inflation
from the start, figuring such a projected inflation adjustment
into assessments allocated to reserves, and those who would
factor inflation in gradually by the recurrent review and recalculation of reserve projections every few years, thus reflecting inflationary changes only after they occur. 145 There
will often be the temptation to invade the reserves to lower
ongoing assessments, or pay for ongoing operating costs.
This, of course, would defeat the purpose of the reserves to
pay for irregular, capital and unforeseeable costs, and is,
146
therefore, ill-advised.
Many common interest community members Would prefer to pay the lower present assessments that would be necessary if calculated to cover only current, projected operating
costs, computed without an extra allowance for reserve
funding. Some would prefer to not think about the risks left
unaddressed by such a smaller assessment. Of course, these
same members-if they are still in the community-will face
the music when the replacement, repair or other emergency
materializes which would have been addressed by reserves
had they been maintained. Sometimes residents feel that
they will have left in the community before replacements or
147
repairs funded by reserves are needed.
143. Id. § 7.40; see also id. § 7.41. For useful summary of the AICPA Audit
Guide reporting requirements regarding community association reserves, see
generally RESERVE FUNDING & RESERVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note
141, at 19-22.
144. RESERVE FUNDING & RESERVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note
141, at 9.
145. See, e.g., ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24, at

104.
146. See, e.g., ROHAN, supra note 2, §7.10[6], at 7-48-49.
147. In an astonishing comment at a reserves discussion in the Fall 1997
CAI National Conference, one Florida engineer who indicated he conducts reserve studies commented on the attitude of many very elderly community association members he deals with "don't even buy green bananas" because they
don't expect to necessarily be around to eat them! Notes from this meeting,
held on October 24, 1997, are on file with the author who was present at the
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In some communities, members may have the financial
wherewithal to address problems only as they actually materialize. These members may prefer to do so rather than have
their association set aside reserves, 148 since overriding safety
concerns dictate that reserve funds held by the association
will often be invested at lower rates or return than its members could reap by individually investing the same funds in
riskier or less liquid investments. 149 The association's rate of
return on invested reserves is further limited by income
taxation of whatever income is generated on its invested reserve funds. 150
meeting. To this author, this supposed attitude hardly seems like a basis for
sound financial planning.
148. See, e.g., WAYNE HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 6.03(a)(5), at 248 (2d ed. 1988). In
conversations with this author, Mr. Hyatt-among our most respected and experienced common interest community attorneys and scholars--he has stressed
the varying needs regarding reserves of community associations of differing
sizes and income levels as a reason for not legislatively mandating the maintenance of reserves by all community associations.
149. See NAT'L ACCOUNTANTS COMM. OF THE COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST.,
INVESTMENTS BY COMMON INTEREST REALTY ASSOCIATIONS (1997). The Accountants Committee characterized the safety of principal as "normally the
overriding consideration followed by liquidity and return on investment" in selecting the proper investment vehicles for association reserves and other funds,
with return on investment being "the last element considered" in such decisions. Id. On this basis, this Accountants Committee highlights as safest those
"investments which are federally insured instruments or funds deposited with
federally insured institutions (not to exceed the insured limitation), backed by
the full faith and credit of the Federal Government," adding that
"[I]nvestments in other than federally backed instruments or institutions which
subject the principal to risks should only be assumed only when the board understands the level of risk and the expectations of the level of tolerance by all
members of the" [community association]." Id.; see also CAROL CAGIANUT,
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES BOOST ASSOCIATIONS RESERVES, BOARD BRIEFS
(1995); see generally RESERVE FUNDING & RESERVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES,

supra note 141, at 23-34 (providing a general analysis of the pros and cons of
the various reserve fund investment choices). This authority also cautions
against investment strategies focused primarily on high rates of return. Id. at
34.
150. Section 528 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1976 to apply to
many community associations, taxes association income on reserves at an inequitable 30% rate. I.R.C. § 528 (1994). Furthermore, a substantial number of
associations may not qualify for its complex prerequisites. Associations not
electing taxation under section 528 of the Internal Revenue Code would instead
file as ordinary corporations subject to section 277 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which would lower the rate of taxation by as much as half. I.R.C. § 277.
But section 277 of the Internal Revenue Code creates its own uncertainties and
risks for associations, and association accountants have urged for clarification,
simplification and reform of the Code as applied to association investment income.

See, eg., COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATION OF
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2. Reserve Fund Legislation
The importance of reserves, not only to common interest
communities but to many assets which function as, or in lieu
of public facilities, has led to a recent and somewhat disjointed legislative movement among about a dozen states to
encourage reserve studies and maintenance.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed state
regulation is the Hawaii condominium statute and regulations. 151 The Hawaii statute requires associations, as part of
an annual budgeting process, to conduct detailed reserve
studies estimating the necessary reserves, 152 and to actually
fund reserves to at least 50% of estimated needs by the year
2000.153 This funding requirement softens a 100% funding
requirement due in 1998, originally enacted a few years earlier, apparently a result of widespread complaints when initial imposition of the reserve funding requirement triggered
substantially increased maintenance assessments. 154 Hawaii
also prohibits each association from exceeding its adopted
annual budget by more than 20%, except in emergency situaThose acting on behalf of the association are
tions. 155
shielded from liability for incorrect estimates in the reserve
15 6
analysis only when made in good faith.
An intermediate approach to reserve regulation is reflected in Illinois law, where a statute interpreted to have
codified a common law fiduciary obligation to maintain re-

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 528 (1997). For
income on reserve fund investments, see
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 141, at
151. 28 HAw. REV. STAT. § 514A-83.6

a summary of taxes applicable to
RESERVE FUNDING & RESERVE

33-34.
(1990);

16 HAW. CONDOMINIUM

REGULATIONS subch. 6, §§ 16-107-61 to 16-107-75 (1990). The regulations state
as the regulatory objective "to ensure that each owner in a condominium project pay a fair share of the short-term and long-term costs of operating the project, based on the owner's period of ownership. Id. § 16-107-6 1.
152. 28 HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-83.6(a), (c) (1990).
153. Id. § 514A-83.6(b) (1990).

154. Interview by Derek Samuelson with Linda Alexander, Chaney, Brooks
& Company, in Honolulu, Hawaii (Jan. 13, 1998). Ms. Alexander indicates the

reserve legislation is still widely unpopular among Hawaii condominium associations, though she considers it a prudent measure to force the many associations which would not maintain adequate reserves to manage more proactively.
Id. However, critics have opposed the Hawaii model of reserve regulation as
legislative micro-management, imposing on all associations requirements which
are appropriate to only some associations. Id.
155. 28 HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-83.6(f) (1990).
156. Id. § 514A-83.6(d).
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serves 157 requires condominium associations to maintain
"reasonable reserves for capital expenditures and deferred
maintenance for repair or replacement of the common elements." 5 8 "Reasonable" reserves may be determined by
taking into account estimated repair and replacement costs,
useful lives of common element components, rates of return
on invested reserve funds, and discretionary items such as
the financial impact of reserve funding on unit owners and
the value of their units, and the ability of the association to
obtain financing for such costs. 1 59 The reserve funding requirement is subject to waiver in whole or in part by twothirds of the total votes within the association, provided that
such a waiver must be declared in boldface on association financial statements and must insulate the board, its managers and the members from liability for inadequacy of reserves. 160 Some other states also follow this general pattern
of a legislative mandate to budget for reserves, while allowing the association's membership by vote to override the
statutory reserves mandate, and to reduce or eliminate reserve funding from the budget. 16 1
California declines to require reserve funding, but extensively regulates reserve studies, 162 and their disclosure. 63 A
further alternative is to require only disclosure of the status
of reserves, if any. 64 Some state statutes contain simple,
broad directives that associations must establish a fund for

157. Maercker Point Villas Condominium Ass'n v. Szymski, 655 N.E.2d 1192,
1194 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing developer's fiduciary duty to fund reserves
to have arisen as of the date the condominium declaration was filed).
158. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 605/9(c)(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
159. Id. § 605/9(c)(2)(i)-(v).

160. Id. § 605/9(c)(3)-(4).

The implication of this section, bolstered by the

language of Maercker Point Villas Condominium Ass'n v.Szymski, 655 N.E.2d

1192 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995), seems to be that liability could attach for inadequate
funding of reserves

in the absence of an express waiver under section

605/9(c)(3) of the Illinois statutes.
161. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §718.112(f) (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS
183A § 10(i), (m) (1987) (requiring "adequate" reserve finding); OR. REV STAT.
§ 100.175 (1990) (future assessments for reserves may be reduced or termi-

nated following the second year after transition to unit-owner control of the as-

sociation; reserves may be used in some situations to meet regular operating

costs).
162. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1365.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
163. Id. § 1365.
164. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 34.08.530(a)(5) (1996) (addressing public offering statements for common interest communities).
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reserves. 165
3. Alternatives to Reserves
It would seem that an important alternative to funding
for contingencies such as those addressed by reserve studies
and funds, would be borrowing by the association at the time
a cost arises, with repayment coming out of increases in future assessments. Some declarations and association documents expressly provide for authority to arrange such financing. But legislatures have largely ignored the issue of
association borrowing authority 166 outside the context of
UCIOA and its related uniform acts.
Under UCIOA, association borrowing is expressly contemplated and authorized, subject to significant safeguards.
Under section 3-112 of UCIOA, the association is empowered
to use severable portions (e.g., a separate athletic facility) of
the common elements of a community as security for the association's financing if approved by 80% of the votes in the
association. 167 UCIOA also contemplates association financing in which rights to future income, including assessments,
is pledged as security for new financing, although such fi68
nancing must be expressly authorized in the declaration.
It remains unclear how actively lending institutions would
provide association financing, even if the association's
authority was clear. 169 Furthermore, financing repairs and
165. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-1-6-22(c) (1979 & Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 559.205 (1988) (delegating rulemaking authority to establish minimum
standards for reserve funds); Id. § 515B.3-114 (adding a brief, general reserves
requirement to the surplus section of Minnesota's version of the Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act).
166. See ROHAN, supra note 2, § 7.10[6][c], at 7-51.
167. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-112 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
591 (1997). A common area or facility can be pledged only where the resulting
encumbrance cannot deprive any unit of ingress, egress, or structural support.
Id.
168. Id. § 3-102(1)(n), at 573; see also Matthew Leeds, Executive Summary of
Proposed Condominium Lending Statute, in TITLE INSURANCE 1996: THE
BASICS AND BEYOND (1996).
169. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. But see Nico F. March,
Loans Are a Many Splendored Thing, COMMON GROUND, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 32.
March observes that institutions are "increasingly offering loans" to community
associations. Id. For example, a few years ago the National Cooperative Bank
fairly recently announced a special program to lend $250 million over a fiveyear period to community associations to finance major repairs and replacements such as those which have often forced associations to impose large special assessments. Id. Eligible associations must be at least seven years old and
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replacements, when they are necessary, to be repaid by unit
owners in the future, would arguably misallocate the costs .of
replaced or repaired assets away from those association
70
members who actually consumed them.
As an extraordinary example of association borrowing
which may presage future financing strategy, in 1995 a very
large community association assembled a $15 million private-placement bond offering to repay a debt to the community's developer and to finance a new recreation center and
pool. 171 Highlands Ranch, a 31,000-resident planned community south of Denver, Colorado, used a 99.8% assessment
collection rate and the resulting nearly $4 million annual assessment revenue to obtain a AAA rating from Standard &
Poor's. 7 2
The Highlands Ranch association had other
strengths to offer investors. For example, Colorado had
adopted the portions of UCIOA which strengthened association financing powers. Also the bylaws of Highlands Ranch
allowed the community association manager to impose assessments if the board lacked a quorum or failed to act, neutralizing a political risk in the event association management
perceived a need for additional assessment income. 173 Attorneys involved in the bond offering recommend this strategy
for well established communities with strong financial histories. 174
4. Special Assessments
Perhaps the most drastic way of raising funds when a
contingency materializes is a "special assessment"-a single
assessment for the purpose of discharging a capital or extraordinary expense. 175 Special assessments can be payable
in one or more payments and a declaration may empower the
board to levy both regular and special assessments. 176 Provi70% occupied. See Special Assessment Alternative: Bank Offers Repair Loans,
in COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT 5 (1995).
170. ULI/CAI FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 24, at 103.
171. See Jerry C.M. Orten & Robert D. Hoehn, Where No Board Has Gone
Before, COMMON GROUND, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 20.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. ROHAN, supra note 2, at 7-48.
176. The sample below was provided by Lynn Jordan, Esq.:
Common Expenses. As used in this Declaration, this term includes all
charges levied by and for the benefit of the Association, pursuant to
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sions relating to special assessments may provide for owner
referendum for extraordinary and capital expenditures,
"referred" to the membership by the board. 177
Accordingly, special assessments have been approved for
a wide range of purposes. 178 Because of the urgency of the
circumstances giving rise to special assessments, courts
sometimes stretch their reading of association documents to
the Governing Documents, including, but not limited to: (i) annual
costs and expenses of the Association, (ii) large, single item expenditures of the Association (including but not limited to, capital expenditures and "Special Assessments"), and (iii) amounts necessary to fund
reserves pursuant to Section __ below.
Common Expense Assessment(s); Assessment(s). In addition to the
definition included in the Act, these terms shall include these items
levied against a particular Owner or Unit: (i) late charges, attorneys'
fees, fines, and interest charged by the Association at the rate as determined by the Executive Board, (ii) charges against a particular
Owner and the Unit for the purpose of reimbursing the Association for
expenditures and other costs of the Association in curing any violation
of the Governing Documents by the Owner or Related Users (including
"default assessments"), and (iii) "Special Assessments" as described in
below.
Special Assessments. In addition to the assessment authorized above,
the Association may at any time, from time to time, determine, levy
and assess a Special Assessment applicable to that particular assessment year for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, payments
for (i) any operating deficit and/or unbudgeted costs, fees and expenses, or (ii) any construction, reconstruction, repair, demolition, replacement or maintenance of a capital improvement and any fixtures
or personal property related thereto. Any such Special Assessment
shall be due and payable as determined by the Executive Board. The
term "capital improvements", as used herein, shall mean the construction, erection or installation of substantial structure(s) or other substantial improvements on the Real Estate, or the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation, maintenance, repair or replacement of
Common Elements presently located on the Real Estate or which may
hereafter be constructed, erected or installed on the Real Estate. Notice in writing setting forth the amount of such Special Assessment per
Unit and the due date for payment thereof shall be given to the Owners not less than thirty (30) days prior to such due date.
Jordan Interview, supra note 56.
177. Id. This approach is recommended by ULI and CAI. See URBAN LAND
INST. & COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., CREATING A COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION: THE
DEVELOPER'S ROLE IN CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS 36 (2d
rev. ed. 1986).
178. Fogarty v. Hemlock Farms Community Ass'n, Inc., 685 A.2d 241 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1996); Braeshire Condominium Bd. of Managers v. Brinkmeyer,
841 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Cedar Cove Efficiency Condominium Ass'n
v. Cedar Cove Properties, Inc., 558 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Washington Courte Condominium Ass'n-Four v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 523
N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. 1988), appeal denied 530 N.E.2d 266 (1988).
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find authority for the assessment. 179 Still, where association
documents lack specific authorization for special assessments
may bar the imposition of such assessments may be simply
unavailable to an association. 8 0
In any case, special assessments spell potential financial
trauma for residents of all but the most affluent common interest communities. By definition, they have not been budgeted by the community, and they are less likely to have been
budgeted by its residents. If reserves are not maintained as
communities age, furthermore, the prospect of one special assessment is unrealistic. A whole range of common elements
and facilities are aging, and repair or replacement will likely
be needed to more than one facility within a fairly limited
time span, much the way repairs start to mushroom at some
point as, say, an automobile starts to age. This may well
mean multiple special assessments for many associations.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STUDY AND POTENTIAL CHANGE

The problem of funding repair or replacement of common
facilities and elements is not a problem limited to any given
association. Because of the relatively sudden rise of common
interest communities the problem of aging association facilities needing repair or replacement for which funds are not
readily available will likely reach epidemic proportions in the
years directly ahead.
As we have seen, the rise of community associations has
been partly spurred by the privatization of services and facilities previously provided by the public sector.'18 If associations prove unable to continuously support these services and
179. Compare Cottrell v. Thornton, 449 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984). The court approved a $600 per unit special assessment for major restoration to a canal system and pool in order to prevent further damage to the

common elements:
[A]

necessary

repair... may

involve

a

major

expenditure

of

funds... The fact that a major expenditure is involved in making a
substantial, necessary repair does not convert the repair into a material or substantial addition or alteration as is contemplated under the
terms of the condominium documents, which would trigger a vote of
the unit owners.
Id. at 1292.
180. See, eg., Lovering v. Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n, 352
S.E.2d 707 (S.C. 1987). See also, WAYNE HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOME
OWNER ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 207-208 (1985).
181. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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facilities, the public welfare as we traditionally have known
it-which has included these services and facilities-will be
injured. Those common elements which are truly private to a
given community should also be of profound public concern
because, in the aggregate, they affect so many of our citizens.
As the need for repair or replacement of community association common elements becomes sufficiently widespread with
the aging of the common interest communities they administer, the aggregate funding problem will affect our society
pervasively and substantially.
The potential financial and social problem triggered
raise the question of what reasonable society-wide measures
can be implemented to lessen this potentially massive problem triggered if quasi-public services and facilities provided
by community associations become unavailable.
A. Empirical Research Needs
As an initial step, research on community associations,
which has increased in the past decade, must accelerate, focusing in more significant proportion on detailed empirical
data we currently lack.
1. Economic Data
Among areas calling for further study is evaluation of
the financial status of community associations throughout
the U.S. Research should address the following questions.
What community facilities are aging and at what rate? How
soon will these assets require repair and replacement, and at
what cost? On the other hand, how well prepared are our
community associations with reserve funding? In which geographical and operational areas do actual reserves approach
anticipated needs, and in which areas do they not? Is there
any evidence that existing legislation has improved the actual funding of community association reserves?
2. Association Management Data
These issues, in turn, call into question a whole series of
deeper, potentially difficult questions about community association governance and management. Empirical research is
urgently needed. What is the present state of common inter-
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est community management? 8 2 What financial and management competencies are currently utilized by community
associations, either from members on association boards or
via management companies and other professionals retained
by the associations? To the extent associations have deficiencies in management and financial competencies, what options exist for addressing them?
3. Assessing the Broader Social Role of Community
Associations
Inevitably, evaluating options for association management entails even broader, more profound choices as to the
general social role of community associations in our society.
This article has focused on the financial role of community associations, with emphasis on the maintenance of
quasi-public services and facilities. But, community associations play profoundly important additional roles as well.
They regulate land use within their boundaries via application and enforcement of privately imposed restrictions that
intrude on resident conduct far beyond the reach of public
zoning or analogous law. 8 3 In their rulemaking and enforcement roles, combined with their financial role of financing and maintaining quasi-public services and facilities,
community associations are truly becoming powerful residential private governments. Their private status has thus far
blocked application to community associations of constitutional safeguards applicable to public governments. 184 Any
significant reshaping of association structures or powers to
collect funds or manage community assets and services po-

182. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
183. Rather than broad dictates and classifications like those typical of many
zoning ordinances, which decree various densities of residential or other uses,
community association servitude regimes frequently regulate minute physical
details of their unit appearances, including such details as the color of curtain
liners or swing sets, the location and content of planter boxes, and the sizes (to
the 16th of an inch) of screws used to install balcony enclosures. See, e.g., Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note 10, at 74.
184. This author has agreed with shielding community associations from
full applicability of public constitutions. See id. at 88; see also Stewart E.
Sterk, Minority Protection in ResidentialPrivate Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV.
273, 275-77 (1997); Katherine Rosenberry, The Application of Federaland State
Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 28 (1984). Useful recent analysis suggesting
more subtle, case-by-case inquiry appears in Hyatt, supra note 17, at 338-41.
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tentially involves reallocation of power and alteration of roles
within the larger, already explosive socio-political structure
of community associations. 185 Thus, changes in associations'
financial roles should be based on the most accurate and
complete possible knowledge of current social, political and
economic realities of current community association life.
Strategies addressing financial issues facing community associations are also bound up with the role of these associations in our society's quest for a greater sense of
"community."
Thus, empirical research exploring California and Florida community associations should be expanded to cover representative communities nationally, 186 probing even further
into the details of how common interest communities actually
function. What type of communities are taking shape in our
What patterns of interactions
community associations?
among neighbors result from which present financial and
regulatory practices? How are residents' lives, and their perceptions of their communities, enhanced, burdened or otherwise affected by present association practices?
Only with a deeper knowledge of the actual economic position, actual management abilities, and actual social realities of community associations, can sensible strategies for
strengthening association finances be soundly determined.
The empirical research to supply this data is necessary to
sensible reform of community associations.
B. Law Reform Possibilitiesto Strengthen Community
Associations Financially
However urgent they may be, proposals for legal reforms
to strengthen community association finances must ultimately be weighed and evaluated against the background of
the type of data called for in the research agenda just briefly
summarized and in the context of decisions on the broader
role common interest communities should play in our society.
Accordingly, the points raised below are intended less as con-

185. See supra note 26-37 and accompanying text.
186. The most complete empirical research into community association life is
in BARTON & SILVERMAN, supra note 34 (focusing on California associations),
and WILLIAMS & ADAMS, supra note 34 (focusing on Florida associations). Both
of these studies, while pathbreaking and helpful, are of limited scope, and require updating.
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clusions or final recommendations than as proposals for more
thorough consideration in the light of the necessary empirical
research. The following points do, however, proceed on the
as-yet-unproven premise that many associations are poorly
prepared to meet the important financial needs which will
inevitably arise during the years ahead. To strengthen associations financially, several types of legal reforms deserve
further consideration.
1.

Tax Reform: Societal Sharing of Association
Obligations to the Public
We have seen that community associations finance and
provide some services and facilities which have traditionally
been within the realm of public governments. These range
from maintenance of infrastructure such as roads, sewage facilities and parks, to provision for services such as trash collection.18 7 Common interest community residents typically
pay for these services twice, through private community assessments and public property taxes. 8 8 This double-taxation
is unfair, and should be remedied.
We have also seen that income on association investment
of reserves is taxed more or less as would be income to other
private investors. However, community associations are not
simply private, profit-seeking investors; they are, in part, 8 9
custodians of valuable public facilities. As such, community
associations should benefit from preferential tax treatment of
reserve investment income. As discussed briefly above, although section 528 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted
in 1976 to provide some such relief to community associations, this legislation has proved ineffective for associations
in several respects. 90 CAI has recommended changing the
tax rate applicable to association income under section 528 of
the Internal Revenue Code from 30% to 21.5%, and modifica-

187. See supra note 15-16.
188. See, eg., Dowden supra note 18, at 36, 44-46.
189. Depending on the community, investment in maintaining various common elements would more properly be seen as enhancing the welfare and private property values of association residents, serving private rather than public
(or even quasi-public) functions. In determining the extent of any public government subsidy via tax relief, careful analysis and classification of association
services and facilities would be required to tailor the tax benefit to match the
public benefits being conferred.
190. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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tion or elimination of some prerequisites to applicability of
section 528.191 Congress should favorably consider these or
other simplifying and clarifying changes.

2. Strengthening Community AssociationsAssessment
CollectionRights: Lien Priorityand Bankruptcy
Changes
At least to the extent it supports maintenance of public
or quasi-public services and facilities, assessment collection
in common interest communities is analogous to collection of
property taxes by our public governments. The impediments
to assessment collection are too great, given how crucial
these assessments are to societal welfare. All of our states
should adopt legislation patterned on UCIOA's "super93
priority" lien 192 for community association assessments.
Ideally, this priority would be accorded to a substantially
greater share of assessments than the six months of assessments. 94 However, the prioritization of even six months of
assessments substantially changes the leverage of associations in collecting defaulted assessments. 195 Wider enact196
ment of UCIOA's provisions would be a substantial help.
Earlier discussion reviewed the impediment to assessment collection posed by federal bankruptcy law. 197 Some
community association assessments otherwise payable by an
association member are discharged if the member obtains
protection in bankruptcy. By analogy to a host of debt
treated as nondischargeable for public policy reasons, 198 no
community association assessment liabilities should be discharged in bankruptcy. By enacting the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, the Congress moved in this direction by excluding from discharge many post-petition assessments. 99 At the
191. See COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATION OF
§ 528 (1997).
192. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 600 (1997).
193. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
.194. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
196. See generally Winokur, Meaner Lienor Associations, supra note 1.
197. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
199. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
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very least, additional clarifications should complete the protection of post petition assessments from bankruptcy discharge. New Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(16) dealing
with such assessments should be amended to include homeowners associations and commercial condominium associations. Its applicability should be tied to ownership, rather
than occupancy, of a common interest community unit, clarifying that post petition assessments remain nondischargeable so long as the debtor or the trustee has an ownership interest in the unit. Furthermore, Section 365 should be
amended to clarify that community association assessments
are not executory contracts dischargeable under Chapter 13
reorganizations.
3. Clarify Association Borrowing Power
States should consider going at least as far as UCIOA in
authorizing community associations to borrow for repair or
replacement of common elements and facilities by pledging
either severable portions of common elements or future assessment revenue. 200 Where funded association reserves are
exceeded by urgent repair or replacement costs, such borrowing is often the principal alternative to potentially staggering special assessments, because it at least allows the
spreading of repair and replacement costs over the life of the
loan the association negotiates. However, the association
must have clear authority to conduct such negotiation and to
conclude the financing. Legislation can provide this authority for associations whose creating documents ignore the issue.
4. Reserves Legislation
The maintenance of fully funded reserves generally represents the soundest approach for financing extraordinary
expenses such as repair and replacement of common elements. 20 1 On the premise that numerous associations have
failed to so fund reserves, 20 2 legislation to increase the adequacy of reserves seems essential to operating associations
200. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
202. Research is needed to determine the accuracy of this premise, and the
degree by which actual reserves fail to meet projected demands on such funds
in the years ahead. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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on a sound economic footing which protects the substantial
public and quasi public facilities for which they are responsible and on which much of our society relies. Many professionals involved with community associations argue against
legislation addressing reserves, based on the varying needs of
different communities. 2 3 CAI recently updated its public
policy to state that, while it
believes community associations should be encouraged to
fund and maintain reserves, CAI opposes laws which
mandate how community associations fund and maintain
reserves. CAI believes that the method and manner of
funding reserves are best addressed by the members of the
community
associations and its elected board of direc4
20

tors.

CAI policy further urges that it is "imperative" for
associations to budget for reserve needs and agrees that
associations should fully disclose elements of their budgeting
process, presumably including reserves planning."'
If, as premised, 20 6 associations maintain no reserves for
capital costs, while others maintain grossly inadequate reserves, it would seem clear that these matters are manifestly
not "best addressed by the members of the community associations and its elected board of directors" in their unfettered
discretion," as CAI's policy asserts. On the other hand, as
previously noted, 207 some associations-particularly those
with affluent memberships-could legitimately eschew reserve funding in favor of financing repairs and replacements
as the need arises.
Of the present patterns of reserves legislation, the Illinois model 208 most effectively combines impetus to maintain
reserves with flexibility for associations to explicitly elect a
different financing strategy for maintaining common capital
203. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
204. COMMUNITY ASS'NS INST., CAI PUBLIC POLICY MANUAL: COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION BUDGETS AND RESERVES 41 (1997).

205. Id.
206. Clearly, as previously urged, more accurate and detailed data are
needed regarding the present adequacy of reserve funding in our community
associations. However, such evidence as exists suggests that reserves currently
fall far short of reasonable levels necessary to cover costs of projected maintenance costs. See e.g., Winokur, Mixed Blessings, supra note 10, at 64 n.267, including authorities cited therein.
207. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
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assets. While requiring maintenance of "reasonable" reserves, this model permits consideration of a broad range of
financial impacts on unit owners in determining reserve
strategy and allows a super-majority vote of association
members to avoid reserve funding, provided that such election be prominently disclosed on all association financial
documents. Unlike the Illinois statute, reserve legislation
should apply equally to non-condominium community associations. Community association reserve legislation patterned on this model deserves careful consideration by state
legislatures.
5. EnhancingCompetence of Community Association
Management
Management of community association finances is most
likely to be effective if performed by competent leadership.
Currently, there is serious question about the qualifications
and competence of the leadership of many community associations. 209 A wide range of competency levels can be found
in present community association management and a wide
range of measures might be contemplated to strengthen the
weaker management currently leading many associations.
Thus, the community association of the future has been
imagined by a prominent practitioner and scholar as one
with "standards or training requirements for qualifying for
office" on the association board. 210 This same noted authority
has raised the idea of "professional board members," paid for
their board service. 211 A different approach to upgrading
community association management might be to carefully
and expressly circumscribe board authority to broad policy
making, and to mandate board use of credentialed professionals in executing general association management, 212 and
in areas such as finance, engineering and law.
Given the importance of association management to the
public welfare, and the growing complexities of management
tasks, imposing legal requirements which radically reshape
association management are worthy of serious consideration.
However, the potential impacts of mandating professional
209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
Hyatt, supra note 17, at 378.
Id. at 379.
See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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association leadership are profound. While the goals of improving competence of community association management
are serious and urgent, they must be considered along with
equally serious concerns about threats to the intangible
quality of life in our community associations. Our community associations-especially in their enforcement of use restrictions binding all association members-sometimes manifest a regimented, adversarial, even oppressive tone which
angers and divides residents against each other. 13 If we hold
out the hope for common interest communities to restore a
constructive, healthy sense of community in our atomized,
postmodern society,214 one might wonder which way it will
cut to turn more and more community governance responsibility over to professionals and corporate managers.
Improvement of association management will likely be
key to placing community associations on sound financial
footing. Further inquiry into financial management strategies-including the suggestions for "professionalizing" association management-should proceed parallel to thinking
through the broader questions of what kinds of socio-political
communities we hope to build in the servitude regimes which
are coming to dominate so much of American residential life.

213. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text; see also Winokur, Mixed
Blessings, supra note 10, at 53-75.
214. Increasingly in recent years, commentators have held out the achievement of meaningful "community" as a prominent goal of community associations. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
ResidentialAssociations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Hyatt,
supra note 17; James L. Winokur, Reforming Servitude Regimes: Toward Associational Federalism and Community, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 537; James L. Winokur, Community Associations Institute Research Foundation Symposium on
Community and Community Associations, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 695 (1992). See
also Special Issue: Building Community, COMMON GROUND, Mar.-Apr. 1998.

